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is a running list of parallel Sextian passages at the bottom of the page. In many ways
this is a useful book; but it is not the book to get if it is answers you want.
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In the monograph with which modern study of the treatise On Soul by Alexander of
Aphrodisias (fl. c. 200 A.D.; henceforth Al.') began,1 Paul Moraux argued that Al.'s
interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of soul was unfaithful to Aristotle in making
form, and hence soul, posterior to matter. In a highly significant paper published
in 1971 D. argued that, on the contrary, Al. stresses the distinction between soul
and body more than some earlier interpreters had done. To say that a certain
arrangement of bodily parts is a necessary condition for the existence of soul is not
in conflict with Aristotle's general doctrine of form and matter. It certainly rules out
the individual's soul surviving death, but Al. had always been notorious for denying
personal immortality, whatever the truth about Aristotle's own position.
Since then D., and more recently A. too, have made many contributions to our
understanding of Al.'s thought in general and of the treatise On Soul in particular.
Their joint (henceforth referred to as AD') translation of and commentary on the
treatise was naturally awaited with eagerness; and now that it has attained actuality it
is clear that it will be fundamental for future study not only of this treatise but of Al.'s
thought and writings generally.
AD argue for a close relation between the treatise and Al.'s commentary (lost, apart
from quotations in later sources) on Aristotle's own On Soul. Much of the
arrangement of the treatise follows that of the Aristotelian work, and AD suggest that
it is in fact largely an abridgement of Al.'s commentary, omitting detailed discussion
of particular passages where these do not contribute to the general picture. Al.'s
introductory section, which sets the theory of soul in its general physical and
metaphysical context, is indeed at first sight very different from Aristotle's first book,
which reviews earlier opinions; but AD show, through links with passages in that
book, that here too Al. is probably following his own commentary. The relation
between the treatise and the commentary is likely to have been so close that some
awkwardnesses in the former can be explained by the process of abridgement from the
latter (pp. 262-3).
AD further show how the treatise develops a systematic Aristotelian position by
drawing—as they suggest the commentary did too—on a wide range of Aristotelian
writings: not only on Aristotle's On Soul itself and On Sensation, the Meteorology and
the Metaphysics (Al.'s commentaries on which survive) but also on the Ethics, on
other parts of the Parva Naturalia, and above all on the biological works, on which as
far as we know Al. never produced formal commentaries at all. (Interestingly, the
Paul Moraux, Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Exegete de la noetique dAristote (Liege and Paris,
1942).
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pseudo-Aristotelian Problems are also used: p. 198.) The influence of the biological
works can be seen particularly in Al.'s emphasis on the heart as the location of the
faculty of sensation, to which information is conveyed from the peripheral sense-
organs. There is a useful classification at p. xxxii of Al.'s different reactions to
inconsistencies in the Aristotelian corpus.
TAve \a\na fot estzbMvm^ M.'s text of the mostVj unpublished medieval Hebrew
translation, extracts from which were quoted in German translation by Bruns, is, AD
show, slight, whatever its interest as a document in the history of medieval thought. At
p. xxvii n. 77 AD support, against Schroeder and Todd, Moraux's view that the
reference to 'Aristotle' at mantissa 110.4 is to the second-century A.D. Peripatetic
Aristoteles of Mytilene, arguing that if the reference were to Aristotle of Stagira he
would not have been mentioned by name again in the next line. But 110.4 is in effect a
subheading,2 while 110.5 begins the subsequent exposition; this perhaps reduces the
oddity, and it is not just redundant but positively misleading (even if not impossible, if
the subheading was thoughtlessly added) for two different Aristotles to be referred to
by name in successive lines with no indication of the difference between them.3
When AD provide so much, it would be unreasonable to ask for more. But it can
only emphasize the value of their work to point out how often the text of Al. recalls
contemporary debates about the interpretation of Aristotle's own view on the relation
between soul and body. If a living being is not to be regarded as a soul animating a
corpse, and if indeed a dead animal body is not, for Aristotle, an animal body at all
except in name, how can soul and body really be distinguished? Bernard Williams's
distinction in this context4 between two senses of 'body', one including life and the
other not, finds an echo in AD's own discussion at p. 133. David Charles5 can
undertake an analysis of material constituents which ascends from simple to complex
without thereby intending a reductionist position any more than does the similar
account in Al., on which AD rightly comment that it is 'a sort of illusion of
perspective that gives the impression that Al.'s position is a materialist one. And Victor
Caston6 stresses the importance of the question of whether soul has a causative role in
its own right for distinguishing between different types of supervenience theory
adopted by members of the Peripatetic tradition. This was one of the crucial issues for
Aristotle's own rejection of soul as harmony (Aristotle, On Soul 1.4 407b34; cf. AD,
p. 147). AD rightly emphasize, against Moraux's materialistic 1942 interpretation, the
importance for Al. of soul as efficient cause in animal generation (p. 115);7 24.1 Iff.
shows that soul for Al. functions as efficient, formal, and final cause. Alexander, in
other words, is at the centre of contemporary debate about the correct interpretation
of Aristotle.
University College London R. W. SHARPLES
2F. M. Schroeder and R. B. Todd, Two Aristotelian Greek Commentators on the Intellect
(Toronto, 1990) p. 30.
3cf. Schroeder-Todd, op. cit., p. 27.
4B. Williams, 'Hylomorphism', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 4 (1986), 189-99.
5D. Charles, 'Matter and Form: Unity, Persistence and Identity', in T. Scaltsas, D. Charles, and
M. L. Gill (eds.), Unity, Identity and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, 1994),
75-105, at lOOff.
*V. Caston, 'Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern', Philosophical Review 106 (1997).
7They also show (pp. 115-17) that he says nothing about the generation of form that conflicts
with Aristotle, Metaph. Z 8 1033b5ff., provided that text is correctly interpreted.
